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Theory in History:  
Positivism, Natural law and Conjectural History in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-
Century English Legal Thought 
 
Michael Lobban 
 
Contemporary jurisprudence can be very tribal. Rival schools compete with each other to 
show that they have the best answers to fundamental questions about the nature of law and 
legal reasoning. Their answers may appear incompatible, in part because they focus on 
different aspects of law. Positivists such as HLA Hart and his followers, who seek to identify 
what counts as law, find its systematic unity in the fact that it derives from an identifiable 
source which is distinct from morality. Hart’s critics, notably Ronald Dworkin, focus on the 
question of how judges develop the law in the process of adjudication, arguing that the law 
develops not with the discretionary diktats of the judge acting as a kind of subordinate 
legislator but though a form of moral reasoning engaged in by the judiciary. While such 
theorists may not be particularly interested in seeking analytical systems in the law, other 
schools of thought – such as corrective justice theorists in private law – seek to find a logical 
unity within areas of legal doctrine, by using both conceptual analysis and moral philosophy. 
Few of these schools now make much use of history in their argumentation – in contrast to 
nineteenth century jurists such as Savigny, who both argued that law reflected the people’s 
consciousness, or Volksgeist, and that it was jurists dealing with legal concepts who 
articulated that consciousness. Where history is drawn on, it is rather by sociological or 
instrumental theorists, who wish to challenge the assumption of those theorists who take an 
2 
‘internal’ view and consequently concentrate their analysis on the language of jurists. 
In their academic disputes, the combatants often seem to suggest that the law student 
needs to be persuaded that only one view accurately describes the world he inhabits. Yet it 
may be suggested that no single theory has the monopoly of truth. Neither does it have a 
monopoly of usefulness. Indeed, it is hardly to be expected that it would, given that different 
theories focus on different aspects of law, and that few now would attempt to create a holistic 
theory encompassing both law in general and the substantive rules it enforces. To understand 
law in its totality, we may find each of these theoretical approaches to be useful, while not 
necessarily definitive.
1
 We may also find that it is useful, perhaps necessary, to look to 
history to understand the shape of the law. To illustrate this, we will in what follows explore 
how theory was used in the century and a half after the English civil war when a number of 
jurists did try – for the first time since the composition of the Bracton treatise – to create a 
holistic theory of the common law. The writers we will explore were not abstract theorists – 
they were seeking to draw on theory for the very practical purpose of making sense of the law 
of their era. As shall be seen, they had great difficulty in making a single theory explain all 
that needed to be explained. 
This was a novel enterprise. Although jurists before the civil war certainly thought 
deeply about the nature of legal reasoning and legal practice, they did not develop systematic 
theories of law and its content. For them, the common law was a system of special 
professional knowledge, or ‘artificial reason’, best manifested by legal argumentation in the 
courtroom.
2
 As Sir John Dodderidge explained in 1629, the common law was ‘not left in any 
                                                 
1
 See also Steve Hedley’s arguments on corrective justice in this collection.  
2
 For Coke, difficult cases could be solved by ‘no one Man alone with all his true and uttermost labours, nor all 
the actors themselves by themselves out of a Court of Justice, nor in Court without solemn Argument’. S 
 
3 
other monument, than in the mind of man’. Its content was ‘to be deduced by discourse of 
reason; when occasion should be offered, and not before.’3 However, in the century following 
the civil war, a number of English lawyers sought to emulate their continental and Scottish 
counterparts in writing ‘institutes’ of national customary law on the model of Justinian’s 
textbook.
4
 Their task was significantly different from that of the Europeans, whose aim in 
writing such works was to give unity to a variety of formerly autonomous customary systems, 
or to assert the national system’s autonomy from a dominant ius commune. A unitary national 
legal system had existed in England since the era of Henry II (1154-89), when the royal 
justice dispensed by the king’s judges began to displace local jurisdictions. But if her system 
of judicature was much more unified than those of her continental neighbours, England had a 
much more fragmented substantive law. For the new generation of ‘institutists’, the aim was 
to show that English law as a whole could be put into as rational a framework as Roman law, 
to refute the commonly held view (as Thomas Wood put it in 1720) that ‘there was no Way 
                                                                                                                                                       
Sheppard (ed), The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke (Indianapolis 2003) vol 1, 307 (preface 
to Part 9 of the Reports).  See further, M Lobban, A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Common Law 
World (Springer 2007) ch 2. 
3
 J Dodderidge, The Lawyer’s Light (London, 1629), 90, emphasis added. Quoted in M Lobban, ‘Common Law 
and Common Sense’ (2008) 21 Ratio Juris 542. Dodderidge went on: ‘therefore there is nothing of more force 
and effect touching the making and framing of a good Law, then the present occasion offered, sith thereby it 
brought to light, that which otherwise would not asmuch (many times) as be thought upon, and giveth occasion 
to dispute that which none would have thought ever should gave come in question. And therefore not without 
due consideration among the Romans, Disputationes fori, and with us Demurrers have ever beene allowed as 
originalls of Law.’ 
4
 See K Luig, ‘The Institutes of National law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’ (1972) Juridical 
Review 193-226 and JW Cairns, ‘Blackstone, an English Institutist: Legal Literature and the Rise of the Nation 
State’ (1984) 4 OJLS 318-60. 
4 
to attain to the Knowledge of them, but by a Tedious Wandring about, or with the Greatest 
Application and Long Attendance on the Highest Courts of Justice’.5 
In doing so, different jurists used different theories for different purposes. Although 
each of the jurists we will study saw himself as writing in a natural law tradition, this was an 
ambiguous heritage, for the law of nature could be seen either as the commands of a divine 
legislator, or as a set of principles of justice accessible to right reason.
6
 It could be seen either 
as lex – a form of commanded rule – or as ius7 – a sense of justice, generating a will to live 
honestly, not to harm others, and to give them their due.
8
 As shall be seen, the first model 
was used particularly by those writers who sought to explain the nature of the state, and the 
rules of distributive justice which derived from that constitution. The pioneer in this field was 
Sir Matthew Hale, whose model was also followed by the first man to publish a complete set 
of Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone. The second model was 
useful for those who were less interested in the state, and more interested in how to resolve 
the problems of corrective justice faced by judges. This view of law was more favoured by 
Sir Jeffrey Gilbert, who planned (but did not complete) a large-scale overview of the English 
                                                 
5
 T Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England (E Nutt and R Gosling, 1720), vol 1, Preface. For the educational 
impulses behind this, see D Lemmings, ‘Blackstone and Law Reform by Education: Preparation for the Bar and 
Lawyerly Culture in Eighteenth-Century England’ (1998) 16 Law and History Review 211-56. 
6
 Cf Digest 1.1.9. 
7
 The ambiguity can be seen in the phrasing of a passage at the start of Gratian’s twelfth century Tractatus de 
Legibus: ‘The ius of nature is what is contained in the lex and the Gospel. By it, each person is commanded to 
do to others what he wants done to himself and is prohibited from inflicting on others what he does not want 
done to himself.’ Quoted in K Pennington, ‘Lex Naturalis and Ius Naturale’ in SE Young (ed), Crossing 
Boundaries at Medieval Universities (Brill 2010) 228.  
8
 Digest 1.1.10.1. 
5 
law, in far greater detail than Blackstone’s lectures. As shall be seen, each ‘school’ used the 
model which was most useful for answering the questions it regarded as most important. At 
the same time, as shall be seen, neither school found that abstract theory answered all the 
questions. Instead, theory needed to be supplemented by history. 
 
I 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England began with a chapter ‘On the 
Nature of Laws in General’. His decision to commence his discussion of the legal system 
with an analysis of the concept of law was not dictated by the institutional model he was 
using. Three decades earlier, the civilian lawyer John Ayliffe began his A New Pandect of the 
Roman Civil Law not by discussing law, but by discussing the concept of justice, which was 
not only the parent of law, but set limits to it.
9
 For Ayliffe, jurisprudence was the study ‘of 
that which is just, and that which is unjust’: justice was the constant and perpetual will of 
giving each his due, and was encapsulated in the precepts (taken from the beginning of both 
the Digest and the Institutes) to live honestly, not to hurt another and to give every one his 
due.
10
 By contrast, Blackstone’s initial focus was on law, which he defined in a particular 
way. ‘[T]he general signification of law,’ he stated at the outset of his discussion, ‘[is] a rule 
of action dictated by some superior being’.11 If natural law was God’s will, municipal law 
                                                 
9
 J Ayliffe, A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law (Thomas Osborne, 1734) 1-5. 
10
 Thomas Wood similarly began his New Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law (Richard Sare 1704) by stating 
that ‘The Law is an Art directing to the knowledge of Justice,’ the ‘constant and perpetual desire of giving to 
every one his due’. Only after having discussed the nature of universal and particular justice, and the distinction 
between commutative and distributive justice did define law as ‘the precept of the supreme power, (or power 
derive from it) obliging the Subject to act or not act under a Penalty.’ 
11
 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press 1765-9), i: 39. Law, he added (i: 43) 
 
6 
was ‘a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is 
right and prohibiting what is wrong’.12  
The notion that law was to be seen in terms of the will of a superior was hardly new, 
having been discussed extensively in the seventeenth century by a number of writers who had 
influenced Blackstone, including Thomas Hobbes, John Selden, Samuel Pufendorf, and Sir 
Matthew Hale. Hale had himself planned to write an institutional overview of the laws of 
England, an outline of which was published posthumously in 1713 as The Analysis of the 
Law.
13
 He did not complete this work, but he did leave behind an unpublished treatise on the 
nature of the law of nature, in which he discussed law in terms of commands and rules.  In 
Hale’s view, law was ‘a Rule of Morall Actions, given to a being endued with understanding 
and will; by him that hath power or authority to give the same, and to exact obedience 
thereunto per modum imperii, commanding or forbidding such actions under some penalty 
expressed or implicitly contained in such law.’14 Consequently, in any legal system, 
obligations arose ‘from the Party to whom the Law is given unto the Party by whom it is 
given to observe and perform it.’15 Elsewhere, he explained that ‘A Law or Rule is not in it 
self effective or active, neither can it subsist or exist without an Agent that either gave it, or 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘always supposes some superior who is to make it’. Blackstone’s theorisation was influenced by JJ Burlamaqui, 
Principles of Natural Law (J Nourse 1748), 77-8. 
12
 Blackstone, Commentaries (n 11) i: 39, 44. 
13
 M Hale, The History and Analysis of the Common Law of England (J Nutt and J Walthoe 1713). 
14
 M Hale, Of the Law of Nature (ed D S Sytsma, CLP Academic 2015), 6. See also Lobban, History (n 2) ch. 3. 
15
  Hale, Law of Nature (n 14) 15. Indeed, the subject of the law was under two distinct obligations: ‘1. An 
antecedent obligation; whereby the Subject is bound to obey such Law’s as are Justly made. 2. An Obligation 
secundary or subsequent, whereby the Subject in case of disobedience is obliged to the penalty or sanction of 
the Law’, ibid. 29. 
7 
works by or according to it. The Laws of a State are the Rules of its Government, but this 
Law must be given by some Power, and some Power there must be that must act according to 
it, otherwise a Law is a stupid, dead, unactive, and unconceivable thing.’16 
Hale’s elaboration of this theory might not have been well known in the eighteenth 
century, but many other writers did define law in similarly positivist terms. The idea that the 
law of nature was imposed by God’s will – an idea elaborated by Selden and Hale as well as 
numerous other natural lawyers – was repeated by several eighteenth century English writers, 
including Blackstone.
17
 They also saw human law in such positivist terms. One of 
Blackstone’s successors in the Vinerian chair, Richard Wooddeson, argued that laws ‘cannot 
be abstracted from the authority of a lawgiver’.18 In his view, ‘[t]he giving of laws to a people 
                                                 
16
 M Hale, The Primitive Origination of Mankind, considered and examined according to the Light of Nature 
(William Godbid, 1677) 344. Elsewhere, he wrote that ‘Without a power to exact obedience and to inflict 
punishments for breach, the Law were ridiculous and vain’, M Hale, A Discourse of the Knowledge of God and 
of our selves (William Shrowsbury 1688) 23, quoted Hale, Law of Nature (n 14), 6n.  Following his mentor, 
John Selden, he wrote that the law of nature itself derived from God’s commands. Hale, Discourse 23. 
17
 Blackstone wrote that the state of man’s dependence on God obliged ‘the inferior to take the will of him, on 
whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct ... [t]he will of his maker is called the law of nature’. Blackstone, 
Commentaries (n 11) i: 39. John Taylor noted that if ‘legal necessity must come from a superior and directing 
hand ... Then I can gather, that a Being of infinite Wisdom, who contrived that Fitness, should be willing to 
demand the Execution.’ Taylor, Elements of the Civil Law (Cambridge University Press 1755) 126.  By contrast, 
Richard Wooddeson wrote that Selden’s ‘very learned work’ in tracing natural law to the Praecepta 
Noachidarum that ‘is not in equal estimation with the writings of those who have paid more attention in their 
researches to the pure dictates of reason’: Elements of Jurisprudence (J Moore 1792) 4. At the same time, he 
wrote that God, ‘[t]he sovereign legislator hath ... exercised his consummate authority. He hath ordained certain 
measures of human conduct’ (10). 
18
 Wooddeson, Elements of Jurisprudence (n 17) 10. 
8 
forms the most exalted degree of human sovereignty; and is perhaps in effect, or in strict 
propriety of speech, the only truly supreme power of the state’.19 Similarly, in his 
Considerations on Criminal Law of 1772, Henry Dagge gave this definition: ‘Law is that 
faculty whereby some lawful superior prescribes rules of action, which those in subjection 
are obliged to perform, under certain penalties, express or implied.’20 Dagge added that every 
subject was bound to observe every law made by lawful authority, whatever he thought of it, 
‘for he has given up his right of judgment to the legislature’. Furthermore, anticipating an 
argument which was to be particularly associated with John Austin, he wrote that ‘the 
supreme magistrate is not himself bound by the laws of the land: For as he acknowledges no 
superior, no one can command him; since such a power would induce the absurdity of 
Imperium in Imperio.’21 
These writers’ concept of law was closely tied to the concept of a sovereign body 
acting within a state. Civil law was the product of a civil society. Human legislators had been 
created by men who had been driven into society as a means of self-preservation,
22
 or out of a 
‘sense of their weakness and imperfection’.23 In Blackstone’s view, once society was formed, 
‘government results of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order’. 
Any society therefore needed a superior whose commands all were bound to obey – ‘a 
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 Ibid 71. 
20
 [Henry Dagge], Considerations on Criminal Law (T Cadell 1772) 2-3. 
21
 Ibid 5. 
22
 Hale, Law of Nature (n 14) 77.  
23
 Blackstone, Commentaries (n 11) i: 47. By contrast, Wooddeson, Elements of Jurisprudence (n 17) 44, 
quoting Coke (The King v. Marsh (1615) 3 Bulst 27) stated that ‘magistracy is by the law of nature, reason 
assuring men that they cannot well subsist without civil society, nor civil society without government’. He also 
argued (at 73) that the existence of political power was God’s will. 
9 
supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the 
rights of sovereignty, reside’ – as well as a judge who could ‘define their several rights and 
redress their several wrongs’.24 There could be no provision in law for resistance to the 
established authorities, even if there might be times when resistance was required.
25
 
Wooddeson also argued for an illimitable legislative sovereign, which had been created by 
the consent of the people. Echoing views which could be found in Hooker and Hale, 
Wooddeson added that this consent was not revocable by the people alone ‘for that would be 
making a part of the community equal in power to the whole originally, and superior to the 
rulers thereof after their establishment.’26 He also drew a distinction between moral fitness 
and political authority: ‘We cannot expect that all acts of legislators will, or can be entirely 
good, ethically perfect; but if their proceedings are to be decided upon by their subjects, 
government and subordination cease.’27 
In the view of these writers, legislators were needed to flesh out, give shape to and 
enforce natural law. As Hale explained, human laws were necessary, not only to regulate 
matters which were indifferent,
28
 but also because the detail of some obligatory laws of 
                                                 
24
 Blackstone, Commentaries (n 11) i: 48-9; cf i: 91. 
25
 Cf [Dagge], Considerations on Criminal Law (n 20) 10: ‘it is not for an ignorant and factious multitude, 
misguided perhaps by a few needy and interested leaders, to determine what is, or is not, a violation of the laws, 
in either prince or people. The common and statute law can only determine in cases where subjects resist the 
supreme magistrate; and the united voice of the whole people can only decide upon the crisis when resistance 
may be justifiable’. 
26
 Wooddeson, Elements of Jurisprudence (n 17) 36. 
27
 Ibid 81. 
28
 Hale qualified this, however, saying that it might be difficult to find any particular action ‘in the concrete’ 
which was purely indifferent; ‘yet we are not presently thereupon to conclude that all these are under the precise 
Command or prohibition of the Law of Nature. Hale, Law of Nature (n 14) 192. 
10 
nature needed to be determined by positive authority,
29
 given the ‘great variety and the great 
diversity that ariseth by the Exygencies and Conveniencys of several people’.30 Blackstone – 
who argued that the law of nature was binding of itself, but that positive law was needed to 
regulate indifferent matters – added that ‘the main strength and force’ of any law – whether 
regulating natural or indifferent matters – ‘consists in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to 
be found the principal obligation of human laws.’31 Wooddeson also argued that human laws 
were needed to give form to the law of nature. Although individuals could ‘comprehend 
whatever may possibly be known to be the duty of all men by necessary consequence, 
deduced out of clear and manifest principles’, they ‘must not descend to conjectural 
probabilities, as to what is convenient, for that is a field of arbitrary determination, and the 
province of positive law.’32 In making the point that a human legislator was needed to work 
out the specific details of what natural law required, Wooddeson drew on the distinction 
(made by Pufendorf) between the ‘absolute’ and ‘hypothetical’ (or primary and secondary) 
law of nature, the first of which regulated man is a state of nature, and the second of which 
dealt with the necessities created once men were organised into civil societies, the most 
important of which was property. Furthermore, he noted that although cases had to be 
                                                 
29
 Hale pointed out that the laws of nature ‘cannot be certainly and definitively enumerated in their uttermost 
extent’ because of ‘the great variety of Circumstances which Accompany moral actions which strangly diversify 
the application of the Generall Laws which we may suppose naturall whereby those that perchance subscribe to 
the same universall Laws of Nature, yet are contradictory in their Conclusions touching particular Moral 
Actions’. Hale, Law of Nature (n 14) 46. 
30
 Ibid 196. 
31
 Blackstone, Commentaries (n 11) i: 57. 
32
 Wooddeson, Elements of Jurisprudence (n 17) 21-2, following Hooker. On Hooker and probabilities, see 
Lobban, History (n 2) 66. 
11 
decided on the principles of natural law where positive law was silent, ‘[t]he necessity of 
recurring to primary principles of right and wrong is avoided, where the municipal 
institutions are express: it is then, in general, concluded, that they are founded on the law of 
nature, or contain nothing repugnant to it.’33 
Writers from Hale to Wooddeson praised the apparently complex English law for the 
detail of its provisions.  As Hale explained, 
 
The Common Laws of England are more particular than other Laws, and this, though 
it render them more numerous, less methodical, and takes up longer time for their 
study, yet ... it prevents arbitrariness on the Judge, and makes the Law more certain 
and better applicable to the business that comes to be judged by it ... It hath therefore 
alwayes been the wisdome and happiness of the English Government, not to rest in 
Generals, but to prevent arbitrariness and uncertainty by particular Laws, fitted almost 
to all particular occasions.
34
 
 
Over a century later, Wooddeson agreed: 
 
a man of the most penetrating understanding would rarely be able to solve an intricate 
legal question, unless a general acquaintance with the whole law capacitated him to 
judge of the various relations and dependencies of the case stated for discussion, and 
of the consequences which his determination might involve, by shaking and 
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 Wooddeson, Elements of Jurisprudence (n 17) 134. 
34
 Preface to Henry Rolle, Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et Resolutions del Common Ley (London, A 
Crooke et al 1668). 
12 
deranging the juridical system. It must be remembered, how great a part of municipal 
law consists of positive institutions, having little or no original connexion with the 
principles of natural law and abstract justice; established at first arbitrarily, because it 
was necessary they should be in some way settled, and adhered to afterwards for the 
sake of uniformity of decision, which the welfare of the community demands. As in 
civil life rules of property must be instituted, they also must be permanent and stable
35
 
 
Why did these writers build their institutes around this ‘positivist’ model? Two reasons may 
be suggested. The first was practical. These writers were seeking to describe the body of the 
common law as a systematic set of rules which could be identified and described, and to 
explain their pedigree within the system. Just as political societies needed to have rulers, so 
they needed to be held together by rules. As Hale put it, ‘what a Confusion would there be in 
the World, if the particular Laws and rules of property were not settled and governed by some 
established Laws or rules, if all punishments should be equal or none at all, if there were no 
compuls[ion] for the inforcing of every Man to performe his promise, or make retribution in 
damages.’36 These rules could be neatly parcelled out in the institutional division of persons, 
things and actions. The law of persons – which in Hale’s system dealt with ‘the Relation of 
Persons, and the Rights arising thereby’, including political, economical and civil relations – 
provided a ready category to describe the rules of constitutional law. The law of things 
allowed for the discussion of rules of property ownership, while the law of actions allowed 
jurists to set out the rules of criminal law. In each of these areas, English law could be 
described in terms of rules whose origin and pedigree could be identified. The second reason 
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 Wooddeson, Elements of Jurisprudence (n 17) 172-3. 
36
 Hale, Law of Nature (n 14) 196. 
13 
was more political: in the aftermath of the attempts of the seventeenth century Stuart 
monarchy to exercise extensive prerogative powers, anti-absolutist jurists sought to describe 
a constitution which clearly demarcated where legislative power lay in the state.  By defining 
law as the product of the will of a sovereign, and by identifying where sovereignty lay, jurists 
were able to show which institutions and individuals did not have authority to make law. For 
this reason, writers from Hale to Blackstone to Wooddeson aimed to set out what powers the 
crown had, and how constitutional power was allocated to different bodies acting under the 
law. The jurisprudence they developed consequently served a particular purpose. These 
‘positivists’ were not concerned with making an argument that law had no foundation in 
morality. Nor were they simply seeking to clarify concepts, so that it would be easier to 
distinguish the realm of the legal from the non-legal.  Instead, they more concerned in 
identifying who had the authority to pronounce what that law was, and who did not. 
 
 
II 
If a positivist theory of law explained that there had to be a single sovereign power in any 
state, and showed that the law made by that power was binding, how was it to explain the 
authority of that sovereign, and the obligation of the people to obey it? How could it explain 
why the particular constitutional arrangements were authoritative? This was a central 
question for seventeenth and eighteenth century writers to address, writing in the aftermath of 
half a century of constitutional crisis.  
In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes had solved this problem by resting the 
authority of his sovereign on a legalistic social contract theory. His was a normative theory 
which explained the subject’s duty to obey whatever laws the sovereign passed: for each 
subject was said to have authorised the sovereign by an act of his will when making the social 
14 
contract.
37
 However, since this in effect preached obedience to whatever authority was 
established, and argued that sovereign power was by nature illimitable, it did not account for 
how sovereign powers might be limited by law, or how a constitution might change. The 
Hobbesian route was therefore not one our seventeenth and eighteenth-century jurists wanted 
to take; for while they agreed with him in wanting to base the constitution on legal 
foundations, they wanted foundations which might define and limit the powers of 
constitutional actors, and to allow for constitutional modifications over time. 
Nor did they take the approach developed by subsequent generations of English 
positivists, who did not seek a normative grounding for their theory of law, but instead 
located the ultimate basis of the sovereign’s authority in social facts, either a habit of 
obedience (in the case of Bentham and Austin) or a ‘rule of recognition’ (in Hart’s case). For 
such approaches could not show how and why the English constitution had obtained legal 
authority. In Bentham’s theory, it was for each individual to make his own present 
calculation of the benefits and burdens of obeying the sovereign: and if enough people 
calculated that there was more utility in obeying than disobeying, the sovereign remained in 
power. The people’s disposition to obey could constrain the sovereign, but (in Bentham’s 
early formulations, followed by Austin) it was not a legal constraint.
38
 Hart sought to solve 
                                                 
37
 See further M Lobban, ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Common Law’ in D Dyzenhaus and T Poole (eds) Thomas 
Hobbes and the Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 39-67. 
38
 Austin did not have access to Bentham’s unpublished manuscripts, but did read Bentham’s Fragment on 
Government, where he wrote ‘That to say there is any act they [supreme legislatures] cannot do, to speak of any 
thing as their’s as being illegal, - as being void; - so speak of their exceeding their authority (whatever be the 
phrase) - their power, their right, - is, however common, an abuse of language’. J Bentham A Comment on the 
Commentaries and a Fragment on Government (Athlone Press 1977) 485-6. Bentham’s unpublished work (and 
his later constitutional writings) showed that Bentham did envisage sovereigns being limited by constitutional 
 
15 
the problem that the Benthamic vision did not appear to allow for legally limited government 
through his theory of the rule of recognition, which was a power-conferring rule which might 
limit the powers conferred. However, Hart’s rule of recognition – a customary rule of the 
officials of a system, who in effect made the rule by their customary practices – did not 
explain where the officials got their power from or how they were themselves constrained, 
nor did it explain the rules of change of the system itself, rather than the rules within it. 
These were the problems which our thinkers needed to provide for, and they found 
their solutions in history. For them, the original power-conferring rule which gave powers to 
the constitutional actors had to be in some way a legalistic one: and for that reason, they were 
often tempted to follow Hobbes to a notion of a social contract. At the same time, in the 
absence of historical evidence of such a contract, they were often forced to invoke 
immemorial custom as evidence of an historical consent, which had acquired the status of 
law. An historical foundational moment was presumed, which in turn created a presumption 
of the legitimacy of institutions and the legal customs they enforced, which included the rules 
which determined how the constitution itself could be modified. Like the common law itself, 
these customs were legal customs in foro, in contrast to the general custom of the community, 
or customs in pays. 
The notion that there was an ancient constitution, rooted in communal consent, 
consequently underpinned the constitutional theory of several of these writers. As Hale 
explained,  
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if the original of government appears not, then we must have recourse to the common 
custom and usage of the kingdom ... For custom and usage hath not only a kind of 
declarative evidence what the original pact was in case there were any, but if it be 
constant and immemorial, it hath a kind of introductive or institutive power.
39
  
 
Hale traced this history from legal sources. As he explained, in tracing the constitution, one 
needed to examine ‘such customs as have been allowed by the known laws of the kingdom’. 
These ‘legal’ customs were to be found not in the community, but ‘in the traditions and 
muniments of the municipal laws, law-books, records of judgments and resolutions of judges, 
treaties and resolutions and capitulations of regular and orderly conventions, authentical 
histories, concessions of privileges and liberties’.40 Looking at such sources – rather than to 
the ‘notions and fancies’ of those who might wish to make new models of governments – 
showed that ‘it is the settled constitution and custom of the kingdom, that fixeth and defineth, 
where the legislative power is lodged.’41 
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Blackstone also took a historical view of the constitution. He was more sceptical 
about the notion of an original contract by which men emerged from the state of nature into a 
political society, considering the theory ‘too wild to be seriously admitted’. However, he 
argued that since men’s weakness and imperfection kept them in society, an original contract 
‘in nature and reason must always be understood and implied, in the very act of associating 
together’.42 Indeed, the notion that there was a contract ‘necessarily implied by the 
fundamental constitution of government, to which every man is a contracting party’ ran 
through the Commentaries.
43
 At the same time, it was supplemented by Blackstone’s 
historical vision ‘of the Rise, Progress and gradual Improvements of the Laws of England’ 
(the title of his last chapter). This chapter mapped out the gradual progress of ‘our laws and 
liberties’, showing the constitution to be a product of time: ‘the fundamental maxims and 
rules of the law ... have been and are every day improving, and are now fraught with the 
accumulated wisdom of ages’. For Blackstone, its very authority seemed to come from its 
history: ‘Of a constitution, so wisely contrived, so strongly raised, and so highly finished, it is 
hard to speak with that praise, which is justly and severely it’s due’.44 
Writers like Hale and Blackstone were keen to show a continuity in English 
constitutional history, unbroken by any conquest which might give absolute power to a 
conqueror. Hale therefore argued that William I had conquered not England, but only the 
usurper Harold, and consequently had only ever obtained the powers which earlier kings had 
under ‘our ancient government, laws, and rights.’45 Indeed, William ‘did not pretend, not 
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indeed could he pretend, notwithstanding this Nominal Conquest, to alter the Laws of this 
Kingdom without common Consent in Communi Concilio Regni, or in Parliament.’46 This 
was to argue that the central institutions which made up the sovereign in the state had derived 
from some foundational moment, whose authority had been confirmed by a continuing 
history. Although Blackstone did not share Hale’s assumption of the foundational moment, 
he did take much of his history from Hale, to construct an argument that while the origins of 
parliament were hidden ‘in the dark ages of antiquity’, they could be traced both in Saxon 
and Norman eras. In his view, the constitution was ‘coeval with the kingdom itself,’ and had 
been reaffirmed in several constitutional landmarks, including Magna Carta and the abolition 
of feudal tenures on the restoration of Charles II, which saw ‘our ancient constitution’ 
restored together with ‘the complete restitution of English liberty.47  
Wooddeson similarly sought to trace the roots of the English constitution to Anglo-
Saxon times. Drawing on seventeenth century historians, he argued that the Anglo-Saxon 
witan had been composed of representatives of the people, as well as the crown and nobility. 
If the Commons had been temporarily eclipsed after the conquest, the ancient constitution 
was revived in the age of Simon of Montford. His historical survey concluded that ‘the 
English constitution has immemorially been in substance much the same, or has at least born 
a strong resemblance to the present system, although its influence was impeded, and its lustre 
obscured, for near two centuries by the obvious effects of the Norman invasion and 
tyranny.’48 Like Blackstone, he felt that the constitution had been restored to its ancient 
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purity in later times. For these writers, the turn to history was not merely rhetorical or 
decorative: rather, an historical understanding of the constitution was essential to explain its 
authority, and so performed an important theoretical function. 
It was not only the constitution which was to be understood by tracing the evolution 
of rules through particular historical moments. History was also used to explain the rules 
which made up the common law, which were seen as the product of positive imposition at 
specific times.
49
 If these rules obtained their authority from moments of imposition, the 
coherence of their content could only be explained by tracing their history. The history 
employed by writers like Hale or his followers was not a contextual, or sociological one, but 
rather involved tracing particular rules to their origins either in legislation or in specific case 
law. It was, in other words, lawyers’ history. Lawyers’ history was employed, for instance, to 
explain the law of property, which was agreed by these writers to derive from positive 
imposition. As Blackstone explained, ‘it is impracticable to comprehend many rules of the 
modern law, in a scholarlike scientific manner, without having recourse to the ancient.’50 As 
in their constitutional writings, these jurists drew on a particularly legalistic view of history 
when discussing property rights:  they held that the foundational principles of English land 
law had been introduced by constitutional consent at a specific moment in time. Blackstone 
accepted Sir Martin Wright’s view that although the principles of the English system of 
tenures were derived from a pan-European feudal law,
51
 the system itself had only been 
introduced into England by consent after the Norman Conquest, at a precise moment in 1085, 
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when the council of the nation consented to its introduction by William.
52
 The English were 
misled, Blackstone told his auditors, and ‘Norman interpreters, skilled in all the niceties of 
the feodal constitutions’ were able to introduce very ‘rigorous doctrines’ which it would take 
centuries to prune.  It was still necessary to understand the ancient system, he argued, for 
although ‘the oppressive or military part of the feodal constitution’ was abolished root and 
branch, the constitution itself was not laid aside, and it needed to be understood ‘to explain 
any seeming, or real, difficulties, that may arise in our present mode of tenure’.53 
A similar approach was used to explain criminal law. Although it was acknowledged 
that many offences were violations of the law of nature - and might not need the signal of 
legislation to tell people that they were offences – it was generally agreed that positive law 
was needed to determine sanctions.
54
 Hale noted that while many offences were prohibited by 
the laws of God and nature, all states had varied their punishments from the Biblical ones: 
‘Penalties therefore regularly seem to be juris positivi, & non naturalis, as to their degrees 
and applications, and therefore in different ages and states have been set higher or lower 
according to the exigence of the state and wisdom of the law-giver.’55 In Blackstone’s 
explanation, ‘[a] crime or a misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a 
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public law, either forbidding or commanding it.’56 Wooddeson argued that the exercise of 
capital punishment was the greatest exercise of the ‘legislative power’, and said that it was 
for the legislature to judge of the necessity of imposing this penalty.
57
  Much of criminal law 
could therefore be discussed in terms of the development of legislation, tracing which 
offences had been punished in which way over time. 
The positivist/historical model developed by the theorists we have discussed suited 
their purposes, for it answered the questions which they sought to resolve. It allowed them to 
set out the parameters of the constitution, and the rules of property law and criminal law. 
Using this method, Vinerian professors like Blackstone and Wooddeson, teaching English 
law to a non-professional audience, could set out briefly and clearly the rules which subjects 
and citizens most needed to know. However, this model of law did not explain everything a 
lawyer needed to know. In particular, it was unable to explain how judges should resolve 
disputes where the rules were unsettled, particularly in the law of obligations. Indeed, writers 
like Blackstone did not devote much time to exploring the nature of contract or tort. In part, 
this may have been because they the law of obligations as essentially ancillary – a law of 
wrongs (or actions) responding to breaches of rights.  For some writers, it was possible to 
explain the law of torts or contracts in terms of the remedies created by positive institution. 
As the author of an early eighteenth century Treatise concerning Trespasses explained, it was 
only ‘thanks to our laws, and not the good nature of my neighbour’ that anyone was protected 
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in their persons and interests: ‘[i]f a man commit a trespass maliciously, I can pardon him and 
pity him as a Christian; but I ought not to spare punishing him as I am a Member of a Politick 
Society, when he continues obstinate and perseveres in his Malice; but this punishment must 
be by Law.’58  
However, this kind of analysis said little about the principles underpinning the law of 
contract or tort (or unjust enrichment); nor could it show judges how to develop these areas 
of law. Indeed, it was evident that there were also many areas outside the law of obligations – 
such as the law relating to criminal capacity – where lawyers developed the law through legal 
reasoning which went far beyond the application of the rules of positive law. Discussing this 
issue, Hale explained that humans were liable to punishment by virtue of the fact that they 
had understanding and will, and consequently had a capacity to obey: ‘where there is no will 
to commit an offense, there can be no transgression, or just reason to incur the penalty or 
sanction of that law instituted for the punishment of crimes or offences’. Since such a general 
view might offer too great an opportunity for people to escape punishment, he added, it had 
‘been always the wisdom of states and law-givers to prescribe limits and bounds to these 
general notions’ and to define who could claim exemption from incapacity. Yet it was clear 
that this had not always been done by legislation: in the era of Edward III, he explained, the 
law relating to incapacity of age ‘received a greater perfection, not by the change of the 
Common law, as some have thought, for that could not be but by act of parliament: but men 
grew to greater learning, judgment and experience, and rectified the mistakes of former ages 
and judgments.’59 When it came to explaining how judges were to develop these kinds of 
principles, the positivist model proved incomplete, and those whose main interest was in 
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exploring how to develop the law of obligations took a different theoretical route. 
 
 
III 
 
An alternative model of law to the positivist one was invoked by those who were less 
interested in exploring the nature of the state, and more interested in explaining those areas of 
law – such as contract and tort – whose principles which could not be readily explained by 
tracing moments of positive institution. This approach was taken by Sir Jeffrey Gilbert, who 
(like Hale) planned to write a comprehensive work on the laws of England and left behind a 
large number of manuscripts, many on aspects of law (such as contract) which had not 
hitherto been given systematic treatment by English jurists. A large number of these 
manuscripts were published as separate treatises after Gilbert’s death, though the works 
which most clearly revealed his theoretical premises remained unpublished.
60
 In common 
with civilian writers such as Ayliffe, Gilbert was more interested in exploring the nature of 
law as ius rather than as lex, considering that the notion of justice preceded the notion of 
command. Gilbert’s treatise of the law of nature began with the following definition: 
 
 1. Laws are the rules of justice and injustice made known by supreme power. 
2. Justice is the giving every one his right and to do the contrary we call injustice or 
wrong. 
3. Right is what a man hath power to exclude others from the use and command of by 
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the rules of law.
61
 
 
Elsewhere, Gilbert began his discussion of the nature of law with the following phrase: 
‘Justice is [the] constant and perpetual inclination to give every man his own, and that which 
can be called a man’s own, is what he possesses either by the laws of nature or by the laws of 
civil society.’62 For Gilbert, the rules of justice concerning rights to property and contract 
could be figured out from reasoning on natural law: they did not need a state to impose them. 
Gilbert was not the only early eighteenth century writer interested in exploring the 
nature of justice without invoking the state. However, other writers devoted less attention to 
the theoretical groundwork. In his institute of English law, Thomas Wood omitted the 
command-based definition of law included in his civilian work, and stated simply ‘As Law in 
General is an Art directing to the knowledge of Justice, and to the well ordering of Civil 
Society, so the Law of England in particular, is an Art to know what is Justice in England, 
and to preserve Order in that Kingdom.’63 To know what was justice in England, he turned to 
English writers predating Hale: Christopher St German and Edward Coke. From the former, 
he took the six grounds on which English law was built – the law of nature (or reason); 
revelation; general customs; certain principles and maxims; particular customs and statutes. 
From the latter, he took a series of maxims, such as that the common law was ‘the Absolute 
Perfection of Reason’, or that ‘The Law provides a Remedy for every Wrong’. This was to 
echo an early seventeenth-century view of law as a system of artificial reasoning to reach just 
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outcomes, rather than developing a new theory of his own.  
The author of A Treatise of Equity – sometimes attributed to Henry Ballow – similarly 
began with the statement, ‘It is plain that Law is a moral science, since the end of all law is 
justice’. This writer’s focus on notions of abstract justice is perhaps not surprising in a work 
on equity, whose function was to correct positive law when it was defective: ‘we do not 
intend to confine our Discourse to the municipal Laws only, but to have chiefly in View that 
natural Justice and Equity, which ought to be the Ground-work and Foundation of all Laws, 
and which corrects and controls them when they do amiss’.64 Since the rules of municipal law 
were finite, cases often occurred for which there was no rule, for which there had to be a 
recourse to natural principles. In common with many of the civilians, Ballow used 
Aristotelian language in setting out the subject matter of his treatise, distinguishing between 
distributive justice (‘of Things to be divided amongst those who are united in civil Society’) 
and commutative justice (‘that which governs Contracts’).  Ballow’s main interest was in the 
latter, not the former, though he did not devote much attention to its theoretical foundations 
of commutative justice. These foundations were described in broad contractual terms: 
 
as an Action or Suit, which is the Remedy the Law hath provided for the Obtaining 
Justice, is but a legal Demand of some Right, and all civil Rights must arise from 
Obligations, and these Obligations are founded on Compacts, it follows of Necessity, 
that the proper subject of Law is Contracts, and that Justice the chief End of Law, 
which teaches the Performance of them. The voluntary are, Buying and Selling, 
Letting and hiring, Deposits, the Interest of Money and the like. The involuntary are, 
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Theft; Murder, Rapine, and all other heinous Offences, whether secret or violent.
65
 
 
Ballow borrowed the distinction between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ contracts, and the 
accompanying examples, from Book V of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and he borrowed 
the notion that every right was correlative to an obligation from Pufendorf’s On the Law of 
Nature and Nations.
66
 However, he omitted to mention Pufendorf’s wider explanation of the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary transactions, which showed that the latter were 
not really ‘contractual’. Rather, where a party was made to pay damages for a wrong, the 
obligation rested ‘upon that necessity of Restitution, which upon a Settlement of Property, 
evidently flows from the Laws of Nature’.67 The flaws in Ballow’s exposition were perhaps 
not particularly important, insofar as he explained that his interest did not lie in analysing the 
‘involuntary’ transactions, but in explaining ‘those particular Contracts, which are limited to 
the Benefit of certain Persons, and presuppose Property and Price’;68   but it was to assume 
rather than demonstrate a natural law system which underpinned the rules he was to 
elaborate. 
By contrast, Gilbert attempted a more philosophical discussion of the nature of natural 
law. Like Hale, he considered the law of nature to be the law commanded by God. However, 
where Hale had seen natural law in terms of the commands given by God to the sons of 
                                                 
65
 Ibid  2. 
66
 S Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations trans B. Kennett, 2
nd
 ed (L Lichfield 1710) 620-1 (VIII.iii.5). 
67
 As Pufendorf explained, Aristotle had called the obligation to make satisfaction an involuntary contract, 
because the wrongdoer’s obligation to pay damages did not depend on the victim’s consent. 
68
 [Ballow], Treatise of Equity (n 64) 3. Equally, although Ballow also noted that it was by ‘universal Pacts’ that 
‘the Propriety and Dominion of Things was at first established’, he was not interested in exploring this area of 
civil obligation. 
27 
Noah, at the centre of which stood the command to keep one’s promises, Gilbert conceived of 
natural law as a dictate of reason instructing man in the requirements of justice. The 
commands and prohibitions of God were very simple, and could be deduced once one 
recognised the existence of God and his creation of mankind: God commanded whatever led 
to the preservation of mankind, and prohibited what led to its destruction. In brief, ‘all the 
laws of nature are reduced to this single head, to maintain an universal love to all mankind, 
and procure as much as in us lies the good of all men’.69 As Gilbert explained, ‘he that acts 
towards the preservation of the species, answers the primitive design of God Almighty, but 
he that acts any thing that tends to the destruction of the species disobeys the laws of 
nature.’70 Since ‘the preservation of every individual being’ could be shown to be the will of 
God, it had ‘the obligation or binding force of a law’. Furthermore, God had implanted in 
man not only a power of reasoning, but also ‘a natural pity to the innocent, and an aversion to 
those actions, which if the table were turned would be very uneasy, and grievous to 
ourselves.’71 A sense of good and evil thus pre-dated civil laws, which did not themselves 
generate criteria of right and wrong, but were judged by them. If men disagreed about right 
and wrong, and fell into discord, it was because they had been given free will, and were 
prone to be ruled by those appetites which were necessary for their self-preservation, with the 
result that the appetites might prove too powerful for their reason. But this did not mean that 
the jurist could not figure out what the law of nature required. 
Gilbert used the kind of reasoning which Thomas Hobbes had used in De Cive, but to 
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very different effect.
72
 Where Hobbes’s theory required a sovereign to be the arbiter of 
citizens’ disputes in a civil society – since men in the natural state could never agree on right 
and wrong – Gilbert suggested that judges could themselves figure out what natural law 
required through analytical reasoning, commencing from the principle of self-preservation. 
Since war led to the destruction of mankind (which was against God’s will), men had to seek 
peace with each other. This meant in turn that ‘no man ought to take away the life of an other 
without just cause’, and that anyone who did so would commit ‘the crime of murder’.73 The 
foundations of property were also explained by similar reasoning: since man had a right to 
preserve himself, and a right to the means of self-preservation, he had a right to cultivate the 
earth and to keep the fruits generated by his labour. Property arose from occupancy of the 
means of self-preservation, which was made up of both an act of the mind and an act of the 
body: no one could have property ‘without some act of his own, for nothing can tend to the 
preservation of any man without some application and relation to him’; and nothing ‘can 
have any relation to him or the means of his preservation without his own judgment and 
consent’.74 Once property was occupied with the appropriate intention, a man obtained a right 
which he could defend. He had a consequent right to defend the property from invasion (or to 
compensation for harm done to it), and he had a right to transfer it to others. Just as he had 
obtained property through an act of the will, so he could transfer it through acts of the will, 
found in contracts or testaments. In this way, Gilbert developed a natural law theory of 
property, contract and testament, which did not require the existence of a civil society: its 
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rules were rather natural. 
Gilbert’s writings on contract remained largely unpublished in the eighteenth century, 
as did his philosophical writings. Nonetheless, the notion that the principles of contract could 
be figured out through natural reason, without resort to the commands of a legislator, was one 
shared by other writers, who published the first English works on contract law. Ballow began 
his exposition of contracts in the Treatise of Equity with the notion that, in order for property 
to be transferred, ‘there must be an Union of Minds and Affections’. A contract required 
mutual agreement and consent, which was ‘an Act of Reason, and accompanied with 
Deliberation’. As a corollary, it meant that ‘Creatures void of Reason and Understanding are 
incapable of giving a serious and firm Assent’.75 Ballow then explained that in order to 
protect them, children were regarded as being incapable of contracting (other than for 
necessaries), and then added that ignorance and error were other impediments to assent. 
Similarly, in his late eighteenth-century Essay upon the Law of Contracts, John Joseph 
Powell wrote that contracts ‘must uniformly be determined by the principles of natural or 
civil equity’.76  Noting that ‘[a]ll reasoning must be founded on first principles,’ he argued 
that  
 
The science of the Law derives its principles either from that artificial system which 
was incidental to the introduction of feuds, or from the science of morals. And, 
without a knowledge of these principles, we can no more establish a conclusion in 
law, than we can see with our eyes shut, measure without a standard or count without 
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arithmetic.
77
  
 
Like Gilbert, Powell presumed that property could be acquired and transferred in the state of 
nature, and he was concerned with teasing out the rules relating to the transfer of property, 
which did not depend on any rules created by a legislator, but which could be worked out 
analytically from the nature of the subject. ‘[T]he regular effect of all contracts being on one 
side to acquire, and on the other to part with or alien some property, or to abridge and restrain 
natural liberty by binding the parties, or one of them, to do, or restraining them, or one of 
them, from doing, something which before he might have done, or omitted doing, at his 
pleasure,’ he wrote, ‘it is necessary that the party to be bound, shall have given his free assent 
to what is imposed upon him’.78 
 
IV 
Those eighteenth-century writers who set themselves the task of explaining the structure of 
the law of obligations sought to develop abstract models, which did not depend on positive 
legislation or on precedent, but on correct moral reasoning. This new methodology was 
summed up in the preface to Sir William Jones’s Essay on the Law of Bailments, where he 
stated that he had sought to explain the subject analytically (tracing ‘every part of it up to the 
first principles of natural reason’ or ‘the plain elements of natural law’), historically (to show 
how those principles were recognised by other nations) and synthetically (setting out clear 
rules).
79
 Such writers were often influenced by models taken from civilian texts; and for 
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many civilian writers, reason was always to trump precedent. As the early eighteenth-century 
civilian John Ayliffe noted, ‘In the Business of Deciding Causes by Precedents ... every 
Judge is a Law-giver, by drawing the Law de Similibus ad Similia, as he fancies: But this is a 
dangerous Way of proceeding, and only serves to confound he Law, and not to do Right and 
Justice oftentimes.’ The fact that one sentence conformed with another ‘argues nothing as to 
Right or Equity, but only concludes a Concurrency in Opinion, both of which may be 
erroneous and mistaken’.80 For Ayliffe, the judge should therefore use reason rather than 
precedent: for ‘in Cases which depend upon fundamental Principles, from which 
Demonstrations may be drawn, Millions of Precedents are to no Purpose.’  This was quite a 
different view from that subsequently taken by Blackstone, who argued that ‘it is an 
established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation 
... because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was 
uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule.’81 For jurists like 
Ayliffe, the route to justice was through right reasoning, rather than decisions of authority.
   
However, if the law of contract or tort might be explained by abstract reasoning, there 
remained many areas of law which could not be so explained. To begin with, as Gilbert 
explained in his posthumously published treatise on Devises, while the basic principles of the 
acquisition and transmission of property by contract and will could be figured out by reason 
in the state of nature, they could not explain the rules relating to English real property: for 
‘however reasonable this NATURAL notion may seem of transferring property by testament, it 
was not admitted into the feudal law; the reasons whereof will appear, if we examine into the 
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nature of the old feuds and tenures.’82 To explain these areas, jurists like Gilbert turned to 
history, just as Wright and Blackstone were to do. Consequently, where Gilbert’s projected 
treatise on personal property and contract began with theoretical conjectures on the state of 
nature, his projected work on real property began with a ‘History of the Feud’. However, 
Gilbert’s brand of history was a rather different one from Blackstone’s Whiggish legal 
history, which served to give historical underpinning to his unitary sovereign state. Gilbert’s 
was a conjectural sociological history, which looked back to the seventeenth century histories 
of feudalism written by Sir Henry Spelman and forward to the four-stage theory of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.
83
 For Gilbert, a resort to history did not serve the function of tracing 
the validity of particular property regimes, or of explaining the authority of the sovereign as 
the source of all valid laws, as it did for the ‘positivist’ jurists discussed earlier. One needed 
an historical understanding, not to grasp why particular rules were valid, but to comprehend 
the nature and purpose of different kinds of property. This required the jurist to do more than 
lawyers’ history. 
Thus, in material published in his posthumous Treatise of Tenures, Gilbert traced 
allodial and feudal property to different sources. Allodial property was ‘the old Patrimonial 
Property revived by the Christian Clergy among the Barbarous Nations’.  It derived originally 
from the first notion of ‘regular property’ which had developed among the Jews and 
Egyptians: ‘The Jews were taught from Heaven, and the Egyptians by the Inundations of 
Nile, to settle in regular Neighbourhood; and from the Egyptians the Notions of Property 
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came to the Greeks and Romans.
84
 In this text, Gilbert described the various rules of 
inheritance found in Biblical sources and in Roman law, describing (for instance) how the 
Roman paterfamilias could disinherit his children by express words in his will and how the 
Roman rules allocated property in case the father died without making any disposition.
85
 
Feudal property had a different source. Where allodial property had spread from the Nile to 
the Greeks and Romans, feudal property was to be traced to the Scythians, the ancestors of 
the northern Gothic nations, which included the barbarians who had conquered the Roman 
empire – Ostrogoths and Visigoths – as well as the Saxons. These nations lived in clans in 
which possessions were not heritable but temporary or transitory.
86
 Feudal property came to 
be heritable over a period of time, for reasons to be explained more by conjectural history or 
sociology than philosophy. The military lords who had granted lands ‘to such Persons as 
behaved themselves well in the War, for their Lives only,’ sometimes married their daughters 
to such vassals. When they did this, they limited the lands not only to the feudiary, but to the 
issue of the marriage. In this way, the northern nations developed a notion of succession 
which was distinct from the Roman one, and one whose detailed rules were to be explained 
by reference to its original nature. For Gilbert, understanding the nature of English real 
property law required the jurist to engage in an exercise in historical sociology. Rather than 
being a framework of rules introduced at a particular moment by the consent of the nation – 
as Wright and Blackstone suggested – it was a system reflecting the social and military 
structure of the Gothic nations.  
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In a similar way, Gilbert also explained the evolution of different political systems in 
more sociological terms. Rather than seeing the origins of political society in a Lockean 
social contract dating from one notional past moment, Gilbert saw political society emerging 
as primitive societies became richer and more refined; and suggested that the structure of the 
polity which emerged – whether monarchy, aristocracy or democracy – would depend on 
socio-economic factors, primarily where the greatest concentration of land lay. When he 
turned to discussing English medieval history, the kind of history he wrote was also less 
‘constitutionalist’ than writers such as Blackstone. In Gilbert’s history, two major changes 
had followed the conquest. The first was that William had converted all allodial holdings into 
feudal tenures, so that all land was held of the king. The second was the creation of a new 
system of royal courts which took power away from more communal bodies. The king 
created a ‘constant Court in his own Hall, made up of the Officers of his own Palace’, which 
supplanted the popular Saxon witenagemot, which (Gilbert argued) had also heard appeals.
87
  
He also granted commissions to sheriffs by writs of justicies, in ‘the Norman form, by which 
all power of judicature was immediately derived from the Prince’, which gave the sheriff the 
power to judge cases ‘independent of the suitors of the county court.’88 If these changes had 
increased the power of the king, the balance was soon redressed. For Gilbert explained that 
although for some reigns after the time of the Conquest, the barons were kept in subjection by 
the king  - since ‘the Norman and English Barons were a balance one for the other, the 
Normans being dependants upon the crown who had new planted them in the Kingdom – 
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after some time, the Normans became more Anglicised, and became fond of the liberties they 
had enjoyed in Saxon times.
89
 In the baronial wars of the thirteenth century, they turned 
against the king, which led to a ‘new policy in the kingdom’: not only the conformation of 
Magna Carta, but the development of a parliament with two houses. For Gilbert, England’s 
balanced, mixed constitution was the product of social forces over a period of time. It was not 
only the product of Norman barons seeking greater liberties in the thirteenth century, but also 
the product of the commons growing in power in the sixteenth, thanks both to Tudor attempts 
to weaken the nobility, and economic changes strengthening the gentry. 
 
V 
Each of the writers we have discussed were engaged in the very practical business of 
attempting to put the law of England into a coherent and systematic order. To assist them in 
this project, they turned to legal theory, seeking answers both about the nature of law and of 
legal reasoning. Jurists drew on a wide variety of theories and approaches, including 
positivism, natural law and ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’ legal history. Different theories 
were better placed to address different questions. As writers such as Hale and Blackstone 
found, constitutional law, the law of real property and criminal law were easiest to put into a 
‘positivist’ frame, which derived all law from moments of positive institution, which could be 
traced through legal landmarks – even ones which (like the original contract) were 
conjectural. By contrast, the principles of the law of contract or tort were much harder to fit 
into this model, especially in an age with very sparse legislation on these topics, and a 
relative paucity of reported case law. Those scholars more interested in discovering the 
principles which lay behind these areas, such as Gilbert, developed natural law theories 
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which did not rest on human legislation, but which could be worked out analytically. Yet 
their models could not explain the areas that the rival school’s theory could – and so, to 
explain the law of real property or the constitution, they turned to a different model of 
history.  
For each of these theorists, both theory and history operated as tools which could be 
used to get a better understanding of the law. The tools were far from perfect, and did not suit 
all the tasks they set themselves. Nor were the theories themselves always convincing. 
However, they were tools which helped these jurists rethink the law and its organisation in 
productive ways. If they did not have the last word, it was because there was no last word to 
be had. Theory turned out to be ever provisional – a useful starting point to organise the law, 
and a useful model to explain parts of it, even if it proved incapable of explaining the totality. 
 By the nineteenth century, the ambition to put all of the law of England into a 
systematic form had fallen out of fashion: in this era, jurists made use of the analytical 
jurisprudence popularised by John Austin to write coherent treatises on different aspects of 
law. Nor did the jurists who reinvigorated English jurisprudence after the Second World War 
seek to revive the grand project of putting all of the law of England into a systematic 
structure grounded on theory. Such an ambition would have been regarded as utopian, since 
few would have agreed that there was an inherent unity to be found. Yet despite this 
scepticism about an innate substantive coherence in law, many post war jurists remained 
confident that their theories were uniquely able to answer questions such as ‘what is law’ and 
‘what is legal reasoning’? The history we have been engaged with in this essay might suggest 
that the aim to find one theoretical answer to such questions is equally utopian. Legal theory 
offers a box of tools, and different tools may be taken from the toolbox for different jobs. 
